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Choice between actions often requires
the ability to retrieve action
consequences in circumstances where
they are only partially observable. Here,
Bradfield et al. demonstrate that this
critical determinant of decision-making
depends specifically on the medial
orbitofrontal cortex in rats.
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Choice between actions often requires the ability
to retrieve action consequences in circumstances
where they are only partially observable. This capac-
ity has recently been argued to depend on orbito-
frontal cortex; however, no direct evidence for this
hypothesis has been reported. Here, we examined
whether activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex
(mOFC) underlies this critical determinant of deci-
sion-making in rats. First, we simulated predictions
from this hypothesis for various tests of goal-directed
action by removing the assumption that rats could
retrieve partially observable outcomes and then
tested thosepredictions experimentally usingmanip-
ulations of the mOFC. The results closely followed
predictions; consistent deficits only emerged when
action consequences had to be retrieved. Finally,
we put action selection based on observable and un-
observable outcomes into conflict and found that
whereas intact rats selected actions based on the
value of retrieved outcomes, mOFC rats relied solely
on the value of observable outcomes.
INTRODUCTION
To choose appropriately between competing courses of action,
an agent must be able to assign values to actions based on their
consequences, whether those consequences are present in
the immediate environment or not. As is becoming better recog-
nized, however, assigning values to actions in the absence of
their specific outcomes requires the ability to retrieve variables
from memory that were observed, but that are currently only
partially observable (Daw et al., 2005; Noonan et al., 2012; Wil-
son et al., 2014; Stalnaker et al., 2015). For example, in rodents,
commonly used tasks such as outcome-specific devaluation
(Balleine and Dickinson, 1998) or Pavlovian-instrumental transfer
(Colwill and Rescorla, 1990; Corbit et al., 2001) require animals
to choose between available actions based on the retrieval of a
specific outcome, whether that retrieval is driven by the action
itself or the presence of specific predictive stimuli.
A number of recent studies have connected this ability to
retrieve or to infer partially observable task states with the func-1268 Neuron 88, 1268–1280, December 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inction of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). In humans,multiple authors
(Bechara et al., 1994; Schnider et al., 2005; Schnider, 2013)
have described patients with brain damage encompassing the
medial OFC (mOFC) as being unable to ‘‘think through’’ the con-
sequences of their actions, relying instead on ingrained habits or
immediate information to guide their actions. Similarly, individ-
uals with anti-social personality disorder, which is characterized
by an inability to foresee action outcomes, have been shown to
display low levels of OFC activation in fMRI studies (see Decety
et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014). Other studies in both humans and
other animals have found that damage to the mOFC creates def-
icits in probability and risk assessment (seeMar et al., 2011;Clark
et al., 2008). Conversely, hyperactivation of mOFC has been re-
ported in people suffering obsessive-compulsive disorder
(OCD) (Lagemann et al., 2012; Saxena et al., 1998), characterized
by compulsions driven by obsessively imagining outcomes that
are not present or unobservable (e.g., germs). Finally, damage
to areas homologous to mOFC in primates has been reported
to induce deficits specifically in instrumental actions and not
Pavlovian conditioned responses (Rudebeck and Murray,
2011), and Bouret and Richmond (2010) demonstrated that
neuronal activity was greatest in the mOFC during actions that
were self-initiated compared to those elicited by a cue. Interest-
ingly, this activity was reduced by sating the animal on the
outcome associated with the self-initiated action.
More recently, these and other observations have been devel-
oped into a formal theory of OFC function, suggesting that it
provides a cognitive map of ‘‘task state space’’ (Wilson et al.,
2014; Stalnaker et al., 2015). Specifically, reinforcement learning
(RL) models posit that animals represent the structure of tasks
through sets of ‘‘states’’ connected to each other through ac-
tions. States are generally signaled by environmental cues,
such as a light or the sensory properties of the outcome. They
can, however, be inferred internally based on previous cues
that are not currently present and Wilson et al. (2014) contend
that the OFC is involved in state representation in this latter
case (i.e., when states are not explicitly cued). Although Wilson
et al. (2014) did not assign this function specifically to medial
or to ventral/lateral OFC, a number of findings suggest that
ventral and lateral OFC play little if any role in goal-directed ac-
tion (Ostlund and Balleine, 2007b; Balleine et al., 2011; Fellows,
2011). Together with the issues discussed above, among others
(Rich and Wallis, 2014), this led us to evaluate this hypothesis by
focusing on a potential role for the medial division of the OFC in
the representation of the state space controlling goal-directed
decision-making. To test this suggestion, we first established a.
Figure 1. mOFC Lesions Impair Specific-PIT
(A) In the Pavlovian phase, rats were trained to
associate two stimuli, S1 and S2, with pellet and
sucrose outcomes (O1 and O2, counterbalanced).
In the instrumental phase, the same rats were
trained to associate two lever press responses (A1
andA2) with the samepellet and sucrose outcomes
(A1-O1 and A2-O2). On test, each stimulus was
presented separately and rats were given a choice
between levers (A1 versus A2). The lever presses
were recorded, but no outcomes were delivered.
(B) Representation of lesion placements showing
each overlapping cytotoxic lesion.
(C) Simulated predictions for the responding of
sham/control and lesion animals in specific-PIT.
The error bars are present, but negligible on this,
and all the simulation figures (OA = other action;
i.e., any action other than the target actions).
(D) Mean lever pressing per minute (±1 SEM)
during specific-PIT test for sham and lesioned
animals.series of hypotheses based on the suggested involvement of
the mOFC in tasks for which states signaled by the outcome
either were not observable, in outcome-specific devaluation
and Pavlovian-instrumental transfer tests, or were fully observ-
able, using contingency degradation and outcome-specific rein-
statement tests. We simulated these hypotheses using the RL
modeling approach proposed by Wilson et al. (2014) and then
tested these hypotheses directly first using lesions of mOFC
and then using the hM4Di designer receptor exclusively acti-
vated by designer drug (DREADDs) approach to generate more
temporally specific inactivation.
These tests provided very clear support for the hypothesis,
revealing performance deficits in rats with the mOFC inacti-
vated when they were forced to rely on only partially observable
task information. To provide direct evidence for a bias in infor-
mation processing in mOFC animals, however, we developed a
novel three stage decision-making task in which we aimed to
put observable and unobservable outcome information into
conflict, predicting that, whereas rats with an intact mOFC
should select actions based on retrieved outcome values,
those with mOFC lesions should eschew unobservable out-
comes and select actions based on the value of observable
outcomes alone.Neuron 88, 1268–1280, DeRESULTS
See Supplemental Information for the
full methods of the simulations and the
experiments.
The mOFC Is Necessary for the
Effects of Predictive Learning and
Outcome Devaluation on Choice in
a Partially Observable Task
Environment
Predictions
We assessed the role of the mOFC in
action selection in tasks with partiallyobservable task information in two ways. First, we developed
predictions computationally by simulating the role of mOFC in
specific Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (specific-PIT) and in
outcomedevaluation using the RLmodeling approach described
by Wilson et al. (2014). Subsequently, we tested the predictions
directly using cytotoxic lesions and chemogenetic-induced inac-
tivation of themOFC in rats. Full details of the simulations are pro-
vided in the Supplemental Information. First, in specific-PIT, the
design of which is presented in Figure 1A, a stimulus associated
with a specific outcome typically biases choice toward actions
that earn that same outcome. To model this, we assumed that
thepresence of aPavlovian state adds abias (D) to theprobability
of earning the corresponding outcome by taking the corre-
sponding action (Cartoni et al., 2013): i.e., for the intact agent,
S1:p(O1/A1)/p(O1/A1)+D and S2: p(O2/A2)/p(O2/A2)+D. Note
that the specific-PIT test takes place in extinction, i.e., in the
absence of an outcome. As such, in the case of mOFC dysfunc-
tion, we replaced states O1 and O2 with the single state O12 to
represent the fact that, when the outcome is not present, animals
cannot make specific predictions about the identity of the future
outcomes: i.e.,S1,S2:p(O12/A1)/p(O12/A1)+D and S1,S2:p(O12/
A2)/p(O12/A2)+D. The simulation environments for each phase
are presented in Figure S1.cember 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1269
Figure 2. mOFC Lesions Impair Instrumental Outcome Devaluation
Performance
(A) The instrumental phase is identical to Figure 1A (A1-O1 and A2-O2). For the
devaluation, the rats were sated for 1 hr on one outcome, i.e., O1 (1 hr) prior to
a choice test, A1 versus A2.
(B) Simulated predictions for the responding of sham/control animals in
outcome devaluation (OA = 0.33 for Sham andOA = 0.36 for Lesioned animals)
(data not shown).
(C) Mean percentage of baseline responding (±1 SEM) during outcome
devaluation (in extinction) for sham and lesioned animals.
(D) Mean lever pressing per minute (±1 SEM) during outcome devaluation for
sham and lesioned animals on a rewarded test.Results of the simulations are depicted in Figure 1C. As the
figure shows, for animals with an intact mOFC, the presentation
of S1 and S2 results in increased performance of the action deliv-
ering the outcome predicted by the stimulus relative to the other1270 Neuron 88, 1268–1280, December 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Incaction. Pavlovian contingencies are assumed to be intact in an-
imals with mOFC lesions and so the stimuli should add bias to
performance. However, because the rats cannot make specific
predictions, each stimulus adds the bias to both action-outcome
contingencies resulting in the general elevation of both actions.
For outcome devaluation (see Figure 2A), the performance of
intact animals was modeled using the procedure described by
Daw et al. (2005). During the devaluation phase, the reward value
of one outcome decreases and so, in a subsequent extinction
test, animals with an intact mOFC should recall the learned con-
tingencies to select the action that earns the most highly valued
outcome (the simulation environments for devaluation are pre-
sented in Figure S2). As the simulation in Figure 2B shows, in
the case of intact animals, the action associated with the nonde-
valued outcome is selected more often, consistent with previous
reports (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). For animals with mOFC
dysfunction, because testing in extinction ensures that informa-
tion about which action leads to each outcome is unobservable,
specific outcome predictions cannot be made. Therefore, the
actions will be predicted to deliver both outcomes, and as the
value of one of these outcomes is decreased by specific satiety,
the simulation predicts a general decrement in the predicted
value of both actions.
Testing Predictions: Lesions of the mOFC
This account predicts that both specific-PIT and outcome deval-
uation will be abolished in animals lacking a functional mOFC.
We tested these predictions by comparing rats that had received
permanent mOFC lesions by infusing cytotoxic concentrations
of N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) (n = 8) to sham controls (n =
9). Representations of lesion placements based on the stereo-
taxic atlas of the rat brain by Paxinos and Watson (1998) are
shown in Figure 1B. mOFC lesions targeted the most rostral
extent of the mOFC and produced substantial cell loss and
shrinkage in this region. The caudal extent was almost never
affected. A strict criterion was applied to lesion placements so
that any lesions that affected a substantial part (>25%) of the
prelimbic cortex were rejected. Therefore, 12 rats were excluded
from the experiment because of incorrect lesion placement or
size. There were 17 rats that were included in the analysis
(Sham, n = 9 and Lesion, n = 8).
Specific-PIT
The lesions did not affect Pavlovian training or instrumental
training (see Supplemental Information; Figure S1). In the spe-
cific-PIT, test rats received separate presentations of the stimuli
(S1 and S2) and choice between the levers was assessed in
extinction. As is clear from Figure 1D, only the sham group
showed a robust specific-PIT effect, selectively increasing re-
sponding on the lever that had been paired with the same
outcome as each of the stimuli during training. In contrast, the
lesioned group responded nonselectively, increasing perfor-
mance on both levers. There was a group 3 stimulus identity
(same versus different) interaction, F (1,15) = 7.06, p = 0.018,
supported by a significant simple effect for the sham group
(same > different), F (1,15) = 17.53, p = 0.001, but no such effect
for the lesion group (same = different), F < 1. Post-training che-
mogenetic inactivation of the mOFC using hM4Di DREADDs
also produced a deficit in specific-PIT performance (see Supple-
mental Information; Figure S1M)..
Figure 3. mOFC Lesions Spare Outcome-Selective Performance
(A) For outcome-selective reinstatement: the instrumental phase is identical to
Figure 1A. The rats were then given 15 min extinction on both levers (A1- and
A2-), followed by separate presentations of each outcome, after which the
lever presses were recorded, but not rewarded.
(B) Simulated predictions for the responding of both sham and lesioned
animals in reinstatement.
(C) Mean percentage of baseline responding (±1 SEM) during reinstatement.Outcome Devaluation
Like specific-PIT, mOFC lesions produced impairment in
outcome devaluation performance compared to shams (Fig-
ure 2C). For this test, the same rats used in the specific-PIT
experiment were given 1 day of retraining on the action-outcome
contingencies, followed 24 hr later by 1 hr of unrestricted access
to one of the two outcomes to reduce its value through specific
satiety. This was followed by a choice extinction test in which
both levers were available, but no outcomes delivered. For the
lesion study, we found a group 3 devaluation interaction, F =
(1,15) = 10.5, p = 0.005, supported by a significant simple effect
for the sham group (nondevalued > devalued), F (1,15) = 34.39,
p = 0.00, but not the lesion group (nondevalued = devalued),
F (1,15) = 1.16, p = 0.298. The effect of post-training chemoge-
netic inactivation of the mOFC was also assessed using hM4Di
DREADDs in a separate group of rats. This treatment was found
to produce a similar deficit in outcome devaluation performance
(see Supplemental Information; Figure S2C), suggesting that the
mOFC is specifically required during the choice test.
Taken together, the results of this first series of simulations
and experiments demonstrate that the mOFC plays a general
role in inferring task states in partially observable situations; in
this case, based on outcome retrieval. Indeed, the simulations
of this hypothesis predicted a pattern of results that was repli-
cated by the actual performance of rats with lesions of the
mOFC. Given the emphasis on unobservable outcomes in the
role of mOFC, however, these effects should not emerge when
outcomes are observable. We assessed this prediction in the
next series of experiments.
The mOFC Is Not Required when Outcomes Are
Observable
We conducted three separate tests of the role of mOFC when
outcomes were delivered within the test (i.e., were observable):Nea rewarded devaluation test, an outcome-specific reinstatement
test, and a contingency degradation test. As in the previous ex-
periments, we first assessed predictions from the hypothesis
for these specific tasks using the RL model (see Supplemental
Information). For these simulations, it was assumed that, with
outcomes delivered on test, each state was fully observable
and trained contingencies could be recognized on test.
Rewarded Devaluation Test
Given this assumption, simulations suggested that no deficit in
devaluation should be predicted for the rewarded test in rats lack-
ing the mOFC (modeled identically to the result for intact rats in
Figure 2B). This prediction was tested using the rats from the pre-
vious study. After retraining, devaluation was conducted as in the
extinction test (i.e., a choice test between levers) except that the
outcomes were delivered. We now found that outcome devalua-
tion performance was intact for both groups (Figure 2D). There
was a main effect of devaluation, F (1,10) = 27.75, p = 0.00,
and no group3 devaluation interaction, F (1,10) = 1.36, p = 0.27.
Similarly, post-training chemogenetic mOFC inactivation using
hM4Di DREADDs spared outcome devaluation performance in a
rewarded test (see Supplemental Information; Figure S2D).
Outcome-Specific Reinstatement
The design of the outcome-specific reinstatement test is pre-
sented in Figure 3A. To model this effect, we followed the logic
described for specific-PIT; i.e., the presence of an outcome
during the test signaled that the outcome could be earned by
performing its corresponding action, implying the action will be
executed. Here, because the outcome is present during the
test, we assumed that both intact and mOFC animals could
correctly recall which outcome was produced by each action.
In the first stage of the simulation, which was identical to the
instrumental phase in specific-PIT, animals learned the contin-
gencies between actions and outcomes. We assumed that rats
without an intact mOFC were able to hold the outcome identity
in working memory long enough to drive responding on the cor-
rect action without requiring access to a stored representation of
the outcome. Therefore, intact and mOFC lesioned rats should
both demonstrate intact performance. During the test, the effect
of the presence of the outcome is modeled by adding a bias to
the contingency of the corresponding action: i.e., O1:p(O1/
A1)/p(O1/A1)+D and O2: p(O2/A2)/p(O2/A2)+D (the simulation
environments for each phase of selective reinstatement are
presented in Figure S3). As the simulation results indicate (Fig-
ure 3B), the presence of an outcome increases the likelihood
that its corresponding action will be selected and in a similar
fashion in animals with and without a functional mOFC.
To test this prediction, rats were first trained on two lever press
actions to earn distinct outcomes, after which responding on both
levers was extinguished for 15 min prior to two presentations of
each outcome each separated by 7 min. Lever presses were
compared for theperiod2minprior toand followingeachoutcome
delivery. Outcome specific reinstatement reflects an increase in
the performance of the lever press action that, in training, was
associated with the freely delivered outcome and this is the effect
we observed in both the sham and mOFC lesioned rats (Figure
3C). Specifically, there was a main effect of reinstatement post-
outcome delivery (reinstated > nonreinstated lever), F (1,15) =
32.817, p = 0.00, and no group3 reinstatement interaction, F < 1.uron 88, 1268–1280, December 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1271
Figure 4. mOFCLesions Spare Contingency
Degradation
(A) For contingency degradation: the instrumental
phase is identical to Figure 1A. During the degra-
dation, one of the outcomes was delivered outside
of the A-O contingency. The rats were then given a
choice test, A1 versus A2.
(B) Mean lever pressing per minute (±1 SEM) for
sham animals during contingency degradation.
(C) Mean lever pressing per minute (±1 SEM) for
lesioned animals during contingency degradation.
(D) Simulated predictions for the responding of
sham and lesioned animals during the contingency
degradation test.
(E) Mean percentage of baseline responding
(±1 SEM) of sham and lesioned animals during the
contingency degradation test.Contingency Degradation
Although intact performance in the rewarded devaluation and
outcome-selective reinstatement tests suggests that mOFC
lesioned rats encoded the appropriate action-outcome associa-
tions during training, it is possible that other contingencies medi-
ated these effects. In the rewarded devaluation test, for example,
sensitivity to punishment could be sufficient to rapidly rebias
choice on test using stimulus-response (S-R) associations alone
(Balleine et al., 2003), just as the formation of an (albeit very spe-
cific) S-R association could result in selective reinstatement
(Ostlund and Balleine, 2007a). The clearest evidence of action-
outcome encoding comes from a contingency degradation test
(Dickinson and Mulatero, 1989; Balleine and Dickinson, 1998)
and so we assessed performance in this test next.
The design of the contingency degradation assessment is pre-
sented in Figure 4A. As this figure shows, contingency degrada-
tion training was conducted in the presence of the earned out-
comes, however, the test was not, and so it is critical in this
study that we first establish predictions as to how rats with and
without an intact mOFC will respond in this test based on our
central hypothesis. To model degradation, the first stage is the
same as previously described instrumental training. Degradation
training typically arranges that the outcome (O1) earned by one
action is delivered with an equal probability when the action is1272 Neuron 88, 1268–1280, December 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.performed and when it is not performed,
whereas the outcome (O2) of the other ac-
tion depends solely on performing that
action. Typically, rats decrease the per-
formance of the degraded action relative
to the nondegraded one (see Balleine
and Dickinson, 1998). To model this, we
assumed that the subject has a prefer-
ence for actions that have a higher contin-
gency (i.e., causal power denoted by DP).
Contingency can be quantified by calcu-
lating the difference between the proba-
bility of gaining an outcomeby performing
an action relative to alternative actions,
viz: DP(A1) = P(O1/A1) – P(O1/OA) – P(O1/
A2) = 0 versus DP(A2) = P(O2/A2) – P(O2/OA) – P(O2/A2) = 0.02 (the simulation environments for each
phase of contingency degradation are presented in Figure S4).
Simulation of the degradation test is depicted in Figure 4D (see
Supplemental Information for more detail). Note that the repre-
sentation of the environment (i.e., of the contingencies) will be
the same in both groups because the outcome is present
throughout training. As a consequence, in both groups the per-
formance of the degraded action should decrease during degra-
dation training because of a decline in DP that, having declined,
will remain low during the extinction test. Therefore, even in the
absence of the outcomes in that test, groups with and without
a functional mOFC should similarly transfer degraded perfor-
mance from training.
To test these predictions, we first retrained the rats on the
same action-outcome associations and then introduced the
change in contingency such that one of the outcomes was
now also delivered independently of its lever press response.
This degraded the contingency on that lever from having a pos-
itive value to zero. Importantly, as shown in Figures 4B and 4C,
the acquisition of degradation was intact for both sham and
mOFC lesioned rats (nondegraded > degraded). There was a
main effect of degradation F (1,15) = 9.677, p = 0.007, and no
group 3 degradation interaction, F < 1. Moreover, as predicted,
the mOFC lesions did not affect performance in a choice
test conducted after the final day of degradation for which both
levers were extended, but no outcomes delivered (Figure 4E).
Again, there was a main effect of degradation, F (1,15) = 9.334,
p = 0.008, but no group 3 degradation interaction, F < 1, nor a
day 3 group 3 degradation interaction, F < 1. As is clear, there-
fore, the degradation effect observed was in accord with the pre-
dictions derived from the simulation illustrated in Figure 4D.
Clearly, rats with damage to the mOFC were as able as the
sham group to detect and to encode changes in the instrumental
contingency and to transfer that contingency information to an
extinction test. This is in contrast to previous results suggesting
that, in the absence of the instrumental outcome, they were
unable to transfer changes in performance based on predictive
cues or changes in the value of the outcome. Therefore, in
mOFC animals, information about the causal status of an action
transferred from training to test, whereas, in other tests, informa-
tion about the specific outcome associated with an action did
not. This finding confirms, therefore, that mOFC critically medi-
ates the influence of unobservable outcome-related information
on decision-making.
mOFC Allows Rats to Infer Unrewarded States and so
Choose Adaptively in the Absence of Specific Outcome
Information
Our prior experiments provide consistent evidence that the
mOFC plays a role in representing task states when these are
based on unobservable action outcomes. However, this evi-
dence was largely derived from a loss of function. In a final
experiment, we sought to provide more direct evidence for
this role of the mOFC by demonstrating a change in strategy af-
ter mOFC damage rather than merely the loss of one or other
specific strategy. To achieve this, we conducted an experiment
divided into three stages (see Figure 5A). For each stage, we
could derive specific predictions regarding the performance of
rats with an intact and a lesioned mOFC (Figure S5). In Stage
1, we trained naive rats to expect the absence of a specific
outcome based on the performance of a specific lever press ac-
tion. To achieve this, we first gave the rats Pavlovian pretraining
associating distinct Pavlovian cues, S1 and S2, with each
outcome, O1 and O2. Next, in alternating sessions, rats were
trained to press the distinct levers (A1 and A2) for S1 and S2,
but with the outcomes omitted. The aim of this intermixed
training was to establish actions A1 and A2 as inhibitors of O1
and O2; i.e., whereas S1 alone predicted O1, A1/S1 predicted
the absence of O1 leaving A1 a specific inhibitor of O1. Similarly,
whereas S2 alone predicted O2, A2/S2 predicted the absence
of O2 establishing A2 a specific inhibitor of O2. The simulation
environment for this experiment is represented in Figure S5.
Representations of lesion placements based on the stereotaxic
atlas of the rat brain by Paxinos and Watson (1998) are shown in
Figure 5B. mOFC lesions targeted the most rostral extent of the
mOFC and produced substantial cell loss and shrinkage in this
region. The caudal extent was never affected and any rats
with substantial (>25%) prelimbic cortex (PL) damage were
excluded. There were four rats that were excluded from the
experiment because of incorrect lesion placement or size.
Thus, 16 rats were included in the analysis (Sham, n = 8 and
Lesion, n = 8).NePavlovian Pretraining and Stage 1 Performance
We anticipated that rats with and without an intact mOFC could
learn the initial Pavlovian S-O contingencies during pretraining,
but that only those with an intact mOFC could infer the inhibitory
A/noO relationships in Stage 1. Indeed, groups did not differ in
Pavlovian pretraining; there was no main effect of group, F < 1, a
main effect of stimulus period (Pre-CS, versus CS), F (1,14) =
221.962, p = 0.00, and of day, F (1,14) = 16.998, p = 0.001, but
no group 3 stimulus period 3 day interaction, F (1,14) = 1.989,
p = 0.179, Figure 5C. During Stage 1, however, we anticipated
that lesioned rats would reduce their Pavlovian conditioned re-
sponses as they failed to learn the inhibitory contingencies
(trained in alternating sessions), instead attributing A/S/no
O and the S-O contingencies to a single state in which all stimuli
are partially reinforced. In contrast, the responding of sham rats
during Pavlovian conditioning should continue unaltered as they
attribute the inhibitory A/S/no O contingencies to a different
state (see Supplemental Information for further discussion). As
expected, there was a trend toward the CS > PreCS difference
becoming smaller over days for the lesion, but not for the
sham group (marginal group3 stimulus period3 day interaction
(F (1,14) = 4.269, p = 0.058; Figure 5D), but no difference in over-
all number of magazine entries (no main effect of group F < 1).
Although inspection of Figure 5C suggests that this difference
might have begun to emerge prior to Stage 1, it is notable that
the group 3 stimulus period interaction was not significant at
the end of Pavlovian pretraining F (1,14) = 1.71, p = 0.212 (Fig-
ure S5I), only began to emerge at the start of Stage 1 Pavlovian
conditioning, F = (1,14) = 3.621, p = 0.078 (Figure S5J), and was
significant by the end of Stage 1, F (1,14) = 6.34, p = 0.025,
(Figure S5K).
This account further predicts that lesioned animals should
make more magazine entries during the A/S/no O ses-
sions themselves, as the failure to learn inhibitory contingencies
ensures they continue to expect outcome presentations. Consis-
tent with this, lesioned rats performed more overall magazine
entries than sham rats during Stage 1 lever press sessions
(main effect of group, F (1,14) = 20.263, p = 0.00) (Figure 5F).
Further, there was a significant linear 3 group interaction,
F (1,14) = 5.009, p = 0.042, suggesting that the lesion group lin-
early increased magazine entries across days of inhibitory lever
press training, whereas the sham group did not. However, lever
pressing itself did not differ between groups during Stage 1
(no main effect of group, F (1,14) = 2.122, p = 0.167, no group
3 day interaction, F (1,14) = 1.85, p = 0.185; Figure 5E), possibly
because of low overall press rates.
Stage 2 Performance
To further assess this inferred inhibitory state, we challenged the
rats to distinguish internal and external information about the
presence/absence of the outcome by now delivering the out-
comeswhere they had previously been omitted. That is, whereas
previously A1/S1/no O1 and A2/S2/no O2, we now pre-
sented A1/S1/O1 and A2/S2/O2 and assessed the rate
at which the new associations on the levers were acquired (effec-
tively a retardation test). Sham ratswere slower than lesioned rats
to learn these excitatory associations, showing evidence of retar-
dation (main effect of group, F (1,14) = 10.52, p = 0.006, and a
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Figure 5. mOFC Lesions Impair the Ability to Identify States Defined by Inhibitory Action-Outcome Contingencies
(A) Rats received Pavlovian pretraining, during which they were trained to associate two stimuli, S1 and S2, with pellet and sucrose outcomes (O1 and O2,
counterbalanced). Stage 1 then consisted of inhibitory contingency training: each time A1 action was taken S1was presented, but the expected outcomeO1was
not (A1-S1-noO1), and A2-S2 similarly predicted the absence of O2 (A2-S2-noO2). In Stage 2, rats were trained on the opposing excitatory associations (A1-S1-
O1 and A2-S2-O2). On test, following 15 min of extinction on both levers, both actions earned S1 (i.e., A1-S1 and A2-S1). This stimulus was congruent with the
trained contingencies for action A1 and incongruent for A2. Responding according to excitatory contingencies should be directed to A1 (i.e., congruent >
incongruent), but responding according to inhibitory contingencies should be directed away from A1 and toward A2 (i.e., incongruent > congruent). The
counterbalanced test was carried out 24 hr later.
(B) Representation of lesion placements showing each overlapping cytotoxic lesion.
(C) Mean magazine entries per minute (±1 SEM) during Pavlovian pretraining.
(D) Mean magazine entries per minute (±1 SEM) during Stage 1 Pavlovian conditioning (that alternated with lever press sessions).
(E) Mean lever pressing per minute (±1 SEM) during Stage 1 training of inhibitory contingencies.
(F) Mean magazine entries per minute (±1 SEM) during Stage 1 training of inhibitory contingencies.
(G) Mean lever pressing per minute (±1 SEM) during Stage 2 training of excitatory contingencies.
(H) Mean magazine entries per minute (±1 SEM) during Stage 2 training of excitatory contingencies.
(I) Simulated test results for Stage 3.
(J) Mean lever pressing per minute (±1 SEM) during the Stage 3 test.
1274 Neuron 88, 1268–1280, December 16, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.
be expected if sham, but not lesioned rats, encoded the prior
inhibitory A-S-noOassociations (thus inferring the ‘‘no outcome’’
state) and these competed with the current A/S/O associa-
tions (and the ‘‘outcome’’ state). Importantly, these differences
were no longer significant by the end of excitatory lever press
training in this second phase, F (1,14) = 2.601, p = 0.13. Further,
although the group difference in magazine entries appeared to
decrease during Stage 2 (Figure 5H), a main effect of group re-
mained, F (1,14) = 4.605, p = 0.05 (although there was no group
3 day interaction F (1,14) = 2.948, p = 0.108).
Stage 3 Test
Finally,weconducted the critical test on the two levers over 2 days
inwhich, after aperiodof extinction, both leversbegan toearnpre-
sentations of one of the stimuli, but no outcomes. On the first day
of testing, both left and right levers earned S1 (A1/S1, A2/S1),
whereas, for the second test day both levers earned S2 (A1/S2,
A2/S2: for simplicity, only the first day of testing is shown in the
design in Figure 5A). On both days, the stimulus earned by one of
the levers was congruent with the trained associations (A1-S1 on
day 1 and A2-S2 on day 2), whereas for the other it was incon-
gruent (A1-S2 on day 1 and A2-S1 on day 2). In the absence of
food outcomes, it was expected that sham rats would infer the
‘‘nooutcome’’ state andact in accordancewith theprevious inhib-
itory associations; i.e., they should direct responding away from
the congruent A1-S1 (day 1) and A2-S2 (day 2) combinations
that previously predicted the absence of a specific outcome and
toward the incongruent combinations A2-S1 (day 1) and A1-S2
(day2) forwhichno inhibitory informationhadpreviouslybeenpro-
vided. Thus, based on our simulations (Figure 5l; see Supple-
mental Information), we predicted that sham rats would respond
more on the incongruent than the congruent lever. In contrast,
we predicted that the mOFC lesioned rats would act in accor-
dance with the only outcomes of lever pressing observable on
test, the stimuli S1 and S2. Because these stimuli hold value as
a result of prior Pavlovian conditioning, in the absence of inferring
the inhibitory state mOFC lesioned animals should act in accor-
dance with those previously trained contingencies and respond
more for the congruent A/S relationships (i.e., A1/S1 and
A2/S2) than for the incongruent ones (i.e., A1/S2andA2/S1).
Responding during the initial extinction period was unremark-
able, with nomain effect of group (F (1,14) = 3.188, p = 0.096) and
no group3min interaction, F < 1 (Figure S5L). More importantly,
during the test period, and in line with our predictions and the
results of our simulations (Figure 5I), we found no main effect
of group (F < 1), or of lever (F < 1) but found a group3 lever inter-
action, F (1,14) = 10.465, p = 0.006 (Figure 5J). Follow up ana-
lyses revealed significant simple effects of similar magnitude
for both the sham, F (1,14) = 5.233, p = 0.038 and the mOFC
lesion group, F (1,14) = 5.233, p = 0.038, although, the direction
of the effect was different for the sham group (incongruent >
congruent) relative to the lesion group (congruent > incongruent).
Importantly, this interaction cannot be understood in terms of a
simple deficit in extinction in the lesion group; a failure to extin-
guish would predict a nonspecific increase in responding on
both levers. Similarly, extinction alone cannot account for the
specificity of responding in the sham group.
The results of this experiment provide, therefore, three direct
sources of evidence that rats with mOFC lesions adopt aNedistinctly different strategy to intact animals. Specifically, unlike
shams, they rely on currently observable stimulus and action
predictions rather than adjusting performance based on the in-
ferred states derived from the predicted delivery of unobservable
outcomes.
DISCUSSION
The results of the current series of experiments suggest that
the mOFC mediates the retrieval of outcome identity when
that information is necessary for choice between different
goal-directed actions and where such outcomes are otherwise
unobservable.
We began by testing recent accounts of OFC function that
suggest its role is to retrieve task variables from memory that
were previously observed, but that are currently unobservable
or only partially observable (see Wilson et al., 2014; Stalnaker
et al., 2015). To assess this suggestion, we first generated a se-
ries of hypotheses using computational RL modeling to derive
specific predictions regarding mOFC involvement in a number
of behavioral tasks. Simulation results suggested that mOFC
dysfunction should impair performance in outcome devaluation
and specific-PIT, both of which require the recall of specific
outcome identities in extinction conditions. Our subsequent ex-
periments confirmed these predictions; i.e., rats lacking a func-
tioning mOFC showed clear deficits in each task. In contrast,
the simulations and experimental results for tasks in which the
outcome was fully observable—i.e., rewarded outcome devalu-
ation, outcome-selective reinstatement, and contingency degra-
dation—showed no difference between sham and mOFC
lesioned animals. The failure to observe a deficit in contingency
degradation was particularly instructive, demonstrating that
mOFC involvement is specific to retrieving the outcome repre-
sentation and that the retrieval of a previously encoded contin-
gency between action and outcome (i.e., the altered action
values encoded during the contingency degradation training
phase) was not dependent on the mOFC.
Although consistent with the hypothesis, the evidence derived
from these experiments was generated by deficits in function. In
a final experiment, we developed a novel task in order to track
the actual task representation in rats with and without a func-
tional mOFC by providing an alternative strategy for the latter
group. This experiment examined whether mOFC dysfunction
prevented rats using outcome information to identify current
states when these states were defined by either inhibitory or
excitatory contingencies; i.e., states inwhich outcomeswere ab-
sent and thus not observable (i.e., the inhibitory state) or in which
they were present and so observable (the excitatory state). Pre-
dictions based on our RLmodel suggested that only animals with
an intact mOFC should encode both states, whereas animals
without an intact mOFC should encode only the state defined
by excitatory contingencies (i.e., the state in which the outcomes
were presented). Importantly, this was reflected in the experi-
mental data; sham animals were able to identify the conditions
of test (i.e., nonreinforcement), infer the inhibitory state, and
act accordingly. The performance of the mOFC animals, by
contrast, was consistent with the inference of a single excitatory
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The Functional Role of mOFC Is Specific to Action-
Dependent Outcome Retrieval
Together, these results suggest that the mOFC governs the
retrieval of specific outcome representations for action selection
in situations in which those outcomes are unobservable. This
role formOFCappears tobequite specific to the retrieval of stored
outcome representations because mOFC inactivation spared the
ability to hold information about recently experiencedoutcomes in
short-term working memory. Specifically, the same animals that
could not perform outcome devaluation or specific-PIT were
able to respondaccurately on the leverwhenpartial reinforcement
schedules enforced delays between outcome delivery, or during
the test phase conducted after a single outcome delivery in the
outcome-selective reinstatement test. Thus, although working
memory mechanisms are often attributed to prefrontal cortical
areas, our study suggests that they do not involve the mOFC, at
least for working action-outcome associations, whichmust there-
fore depend onother regions (Wilson et al., 2014; Ragozzino et al.,
2002).
The proposed role for mOFC also appears to be specific to the
retrieval of action-dependent, as opposed to stimulus-depen-
dent, outcome representations. This is consistent with findings
that damage to the homologous region in macaque monkeys,
i.e., Walker’s area 14, did not affect stimulus-driven (Pavlovian)
devaluation performance, but did affect rates of instrumental
responding over days (Rudebeck and Murray, 2011). It is further
consistentwith the finding that instrumental outcomedevaluation
is impaired in Rhesus monkeys with lesions to their entire OFC
(Rhodes and Murray, 2013). Furthermore, an fMRI study in hu-
mans revealed that the BOLD response in the mOFC was larger
when participants chose an action associated with a valued
outcome compared with an action associated with a devalued
outcome (Valentin et al., 2007). Current results do appear to be
at odds, however, with those of Gourley et al. (2010), who found
nodeficit in outcomedevaluation performance inmicewith (post-
training) mOFC lesions. This difference is likely because the
devaluation test employed by Gourley et al. (2010) was funda-
mentally different to the one performed here and involved
comparing groups on a single score that consisted of lever press-
ing after being sated on the outcome that was normalized to lever
pressing under deprivation conditions on the following day. Thus,
their procedure appears to be more a test of general motivation
than of sensory-specific outcome devaluation. The Gourley
et al. (2010) finding is, however, also at odds with a prior finding
that large OFC lesions encompassing mOFC impaired perfor-
mance on a task similar to theirs (Butter et al., 1963).
Generally, therefore, the mOFC appears to be consistently
involved in action-dependent outcome retrieval. Although the
medial and lateral portions of the OFC appear to differ with re-
gards to their role in instrumental outcome devaluation, there is
some overlap in other deficits caused by damage to these re-
gions. For example, similar to the results observed here, post-
training lesions of lOFC impair the expression of specific-PIT
(Ostlund and Balleine, 2007b) and combined lesions of the
ventral/lateral OFC given either post- or pretraining impaired
specific-PIT (Balleine et al., 2011). Unlike the current results,
however, these vOFC/lOFC-induced deficits appear to be due
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tingency degradation (Ostlund andBalleine, 2007b) and previous
evidence suggests that they also impair Pavlovian outcome
devaluation (see Pickens et al., 2005). Although rat, primate,
and human homologies must be treated with caution, taken
together with the current results, we suggest that the medial
and lateral OFC play a similar role, but in distinct functional sys-
tems: whereas the mOFC mediates action-dependent outcome
retrieval, the v/lOFC appears to mediate stimulus-dependent
outcome retrieval.
The mOFC Plays a Unique Role in Goal-Directed Action
Relative to Other Prefrontal Cortex Structures
Another nearby structure that mediates responding in tasks
similar to those in the current study is the PL. Specifically, like
mOFC dysfunction, lesions of the PL have been found to abolish
outcome devaluation performance (Corbit and Balleine, 2003;
Killcross and Coutureau, 2003). There are three findings, how-
ever, that distinguish the pattern of deficits produced by PL
dysfunction from current results: (1) PL damage leaves spe-
cific-PIT performance intact (Corbit and Balleine, 2003), (2) PL
damage abolishes instrumental contingency degradation
learning (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Corbit and Balleine,
2003), and (3) post-training PL lesions have been found to spare
outcome devaluation performance (Ostlund and Balleine, 2005;
Tran-Tu-Yen et al., 2009). Thus, the pattern of deficits observed
after PL damage is consistent with a role in encoding the
action-outcome contingency and this differs from the effect of
mOFC damage, which leaves contingency degradation intact.
In RL terms, this ‘‘contingency-encoding’’ function for PL is
described as P(OjA). The role of mOFC can be further distin-
guished from that of other structures that play a role in instru-
mental conditioning, such as the basolateral amygdala (BLA),
which is thought to encode incentive value, or in RL terms, the
learning of the reward value of each state (see Balleine et al.,
2003; Parkes and Balleine, 2013). Specifically, although lesions
of the BLA also attenuate outcome devaluation performance, un-
like mOFC lesions, BLA lesions attenuate devaluation perfor-
mance in both extinction and rewarded tests.
Therefore, the observed pattern of deficits resulting from
mOFC dysfunction is unique and, in conjunction with the results
of the three stage decision-making task, strongly suggests that
the mOFC functions to establish task states based on the
retrieval of currently unobservable (action-dependent) outcome
information. Although it might be surprising, given their intrinsic
similarity, that damage to different regions of prefrontal cortex
(PFC) should produce such unique patterns of deficits, it is
strongly supported by current and prior research findings as
well as compelling evidence that the anatomical networks to
which each structure contributes are also unique (Hoover and
Vertes, 2011; Reep et al., 1996).
mOFC Involvement in Circuits Mediating Goal-Directed
Learning and Performance
The mOFC must, of course, carry out its function in concert with
many of these structures to form the broader circuit mediating
goal-directed action. Tract tracing studies have revealed that
the mOFC is widely connected with regions important for the.
encoding and initiation of goal-directed action, including the PL,
posterior dorsomedial striatum (pDMS), nucleus accumbens
(NAC) core, and BLA, as well as the insular cortex (IC), and me-
diodorsal thalamus (MD) (Reep et al., 1996; Hoover and Vertes,
2011). However, current results suggest that the mOFC input is
more critical for the performance of goal-directed actions; i.e.,
in the way information is used to select actions in choice situa-
tions rather than in encoding specific associations between
actions and outcomes. This suggests that projections arising
from regions such as the IC and BLA to mOFC, as well as
projections from mOFC to the medial portion of the striatum
(particularly the NAC core), might be particularly important to
our observed effects because these are the structures that
have been specifically implicated in the performance of goal-
directed actions (Corbit et al., 2001; Parkes and Balleine, 2013;
Parkes et al., 2015; Hart et al., 2014). Nevertheless, a possible
mechanism that could require mOFC input during action-
outcome learning is that of inhibition and particularly inhibitory
action-outcome associations, the importance of which have
only recently begun to be recognized (Laurent and Balleine,
2015). This could be achieved via projections from mOFC to
structures involved in action-outcome encoding such as PL,
pDMS, and MD (Corbit and Balleine, 2003; Corbit et al., 2003;
Yin et al., 2005). The idea that the mOFC mediates inhibitory ac-
tion-outcome encoding could also account for other findings
regarding OFC involvement in reflecting on unchosen actions
in studies of counterfactual reasoning (Steiner and Redish,
2012) and regret (Steiner and Redish, 2014).
Similarly, many of the findings regarding the role of the mOFC
in probability and/or risk estimation can be reinterpreted within
the current framework. Probability estimations require the ability
to retrieve abstract outcome representations to determine how
often an outcome has been present versus absent and, there-
fore, any deficit in this ability might also impair the accuracy of
such estimations. Stopper et al. (2014) examined the effects of
reversible inactivation induced by intra-mOFC baclofen-musci-
mol infusions during a probabilistic discounting task and found
that inactivating the mOFC increased the number of times ani-
mals chose the ‘‘large/risky’’ lever relative to the ‘‘small/certain’’
lever. Closer analysis revealed that this was the result of a ten-
dency to ‘‘win-stay’’ following the receipt of a large, but risky
reward relative to controls, which is precisely what should be
predicted if an animal were relying on its most recent experience
of reinforcement instead of estimating the overall likelihood of
receiving an outcome. Similarly, Mar et al. (2011) found that
mOFC lesions produced deficits in delay discounting in rats in
a situation in which they had to choose between one lever that
earned a single pellet immediately, and another lever that earned
four pellets at increasing delays. Rats with mOFC lesions did not
differ from controls at 0 s, but at 10 and 20 s delays, persisted
more than control rats in choosing the lever associated with a
large reward. Again, this result is to be expected if these relative
delays were sufficient to challenge outcome retrieval processes
in the lesioned rats, resulting in a reliance on more immediate
reward. These differences dissipated at longer (40 and 60 s) de-
lays, however, possibly when the limits of working memory had
been reached in the intact controls. Human patients with
vmPFC/mOFC damage have also been found to display riskierNebehavior than healthy controls in gambling tasks (Clark et al.,
2008).
It is important to note that the role we have outlined for mOFC
is not simply an ‘‘action-focused’’ version of the Schoenbaum
et al. (2009) stimulus-guided ‘‘outcome expectancy’’ account
of OFC function, despite some obvious overlap. This is mainly
because, unlike the current account, Schoenbaum et al. (2009)
do not distinguish between outcome expectancies that are
formed in the presence versus the absence of the outcome.
Thus, on their account, mOFC inactivation should impair both.
Other accounts of OFC function have posited that vmPFC/
mOFC might govern the assignment of value or attention to
relevant choices (see Rudebeck and Murray, 2011). However,
neither account can explain why mOFC lesioned rats should
favor congruent versus incongruent responding in our final
experiment. In contrast, a failure accurately to assign value to,
or attend to, relevant options should be expected to generate
a nonspecific deficit in responding. The mOFC could, however,
play a related role in matching incentive value information to
the specific identity of the outcome in the absence of the
outcome itself. In a similar manner, the current study could be
interpreted as broadly consistent with an alternate ‘‘neuroeco-
nomic’’ theory of OFC function (Levy and Glimcher, 2012), that
suggests the OFC is responsible for translating information
about different types of reward into a ‘‘neural common currency’’
to influence decision-making. Levy and Glimcher (2012) based
their theory on ameta-analysis of human fMRI studies that found
activity in the vmPFC/OFC to be reflective of specific information
about a variety of outcomes including money, food, water, nov-
elty items, pain, and social subjective values. In addition, the
calculation of a risk aversion parameter for one reward type
(e.g., food) that could predict risk aversion for another reward
type (e.g., money) was provided as evidence that vmPFC/OFC
activity reflects the conversion of different outcome-specific in-
formation to a common scale. The success of such calculations
must, however, necessarily depend on an underlying compari-
son of the features of outcomes that belong to different reward
types, and this must almost certainly occur in the abstract; that
is, when one or more of those outcomes are not directly observ-
able. It is conceivable, therefore, that the currently proposed
function for mOFC could underlie these kinds of value-based
comparisons.
Conclusions
The findings reported here reveal a new role for mOFC function.
Although outcome devaluation and specific-PIT are thought
to have dissociable roles in action selection, both require the
retrieval of specific outcome representations when those out-
comes are unobservable and both are impaired by mOFC
dysfunction. By contrast, outcome-selective reinstatement and
contingency degradation assessments are conducted in the
presence of outcomes and are unaffected by mOFC dysfunc-
tion. These experiments suggest, therefore, that the ability
to think through the consequences of actions depends on the
mOFC, and that mOFC dysfunction can impair decisions
about which action to take when those consequences must be
inferred. Furthermore, our final experiment demonstrated that
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states of the world based on retrieval of specific outcome infor-
mation, something that clearly altered the animals’ strategy to-
ward selecting actions based solely on observable information.
Taken together, these results suggest that the mOFC mediates
the retrieval of action-dependent outcome representations
in situations where such outcomes are unobservable, a capacity
that is critical for animals accurately to identify the state of the
world and so select the optimal goal-directed action.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Full details of the experimental procedures and all simulations are provided in
the Supplemental Information.
Subjects
For each lesion study, male Long-Evans rats, weighing between 300–400 g
at the beginning of the experiment were used as subjects. During behavioral
training and testing, rats were maintained at z85% of their free-feeding
body weight by restricting their food intake to 10 g of their maintenance diet
per day. All procedures were approved by the University of Sydney Animal
Ethics Committee.
Behavioral Procedures: PIT, Outcome Devaluation, Outcome-
Selective Reinstatement, and Contingency Degradation
Pavlovian Training
For the first 8 days, rats were placed in operant chambers for 60 min during
which they received eight 2 min presentations of two conditioned stimuli
(CS; white noise or clicker) paired with one of two outcomes (pellets or su-
crose) that were presented on a random time 30 s schedule throughout the
CS. Each CS was presented 4 times, with a variable intertrial interval (ITI)
that averaged to 5 min. CS-outcome pairings were counterbalanced. Maga-
zine entries throughout the session were recorded and separated into a CS
period and an interval before CS presentations of equal length (PreCS; 2 min).
Instrumental Training
For the following 8 days, rats were trained to lever press on random ratio
schedules of reinforcement. Each session lasted for 50 min and consisted
of two 10 min sessions on each lever (i.e., 20 min on left lever and 20 min
on right lever in total) separated by a 2.5 min time-out period in which the
levers were retracted and the houselight was turned off. The order of presen-
tation of each lever was pseudorandom and counterbalanced, as were the
specific lever press-outcome contingencies. For the first 2 days, lever press-
ing was continuously reinforced. Rats were shifted to a random ratio (RR)-5
schedule for the next 3 days (i.e., each action delivered an outcome with a
probability of 0.2), then to an RR-10 schedule (or a probability of 0.1) for
the final 3 days.
Specific PIT
Following the last day of instrumental training, responding on both levers was
first extinguished for 8 min to reduce baseline performance. Subsequently,
each CS was presented four times over the next 40 min in the following order:
clicker-noise-noise-clicker-noise-clicker-clicker-noise. Each CS lasted 2 min
and had a fixed ITI of 3 min. Magazine entries and lever pressing rates were
recorded throughout the session and responses were separated into PreCS
and CS periods (2 min each). Lever presses were recorded, but not reinforced.
Devaluation Extinction Tests
The following day, rats were given 1 day of instrumental retraining on RR-10 in
the manner previously described. On the following day, rats were given free
access to either the pellets (25 g placed in a bowl) or the sucrose solution
(100 ml in a drinking bottle) for 1 hr. The aim of this prefeeding procedure
was to satiate the animal specifically on the prefed outcome, thereby reducing
its value relative to the nonprefed outcome (cf. Balleine and Dickinson, 1998).
Rats were then placed in the operant chamber for a 5 min choice extinction
test. During this test, both levers were extended and lever presses recorded,
but no outcomes were delivered. The next day, a second devaluation test
was administered with the opposite outcome. Rats were then placed back
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Rats were devalued on either pellets or sucrose in the manner described pre-
viously. Rats were then placed in the operant chamber for 15min in which both
levers were extended, lever presses recorded, and outcomes were delivered.
Outcome-Induced Reinstatement Test
Subsequent to devaluation testing, rats received instrumental retraining on an
RR-10 schedule for 1 day. The next day, rats received a 15 min period of
extinction to lower the rate of responding. They then received four reinstate-
ment trials separated by 7 min each. Each reinstatement trial consisted of a
single delivery of either the sucrose solution or the grain pellet. All rats received
the same trial order: sucrose, pellet, pellet, and sucrose. Responding was
measured during the 2 min periods immediately before (pre) and after (post)
each delivery.
Contingency Degradation Procedure
Subsequent to the reinstatement test, rats again received 1 day of instrumental
retraining on an RR-10 schedule. Contingency degradation training occurred
over the following 6 days. Rats continued to receive these same action-
outcome pairings on an RR-20 schedule. In addition, one of the two outcomes
(either pellets or sucrose) was delivered outside of the lever press-outcome
contingency, i.e., in each second that no lever pressing occurred, either su-
crose or pellets were delivered with the same probability (p[outcome/no ac-
tion] = 0.05) that a lever press earned that outcome. As a result, the probability
of earning one of the two outcomes was the same whether the animal pressed
the lever or not. The other action-outcome contingency was nondegraded
because the rat was still required to press the lever to receive that outcome.
For half of the animals, the lever press-pellet contingency was degraded,
and the lever press-sucrose contingency remained intact. The remaining ani-
mals received the opposite arrangement. Rats were given two 20 min training
sessions each day, one on each lever.
Contingency Degradation Extinction Test
After the final day of contingency training, rats in both groups received a 5 min
choice extinction test. During this test, both levers were extended and lever
presses recorded, but no outcomes were delivered.
Behavioral Procedures: ‘‘Three Stage Task State’’ Experiment
Stage 1: Inhibitory Response-Stimulus-No Outcome Associations
Schedule of Pavlovian and Instrumental Training. Rats received only
Pavlovian training for the first 8 days. Rats then received 14 alternating ses-
sions of Pavlovian and inhibitory instrumental training.
Pavlovian Training
Rats were placed in operant chambers for z15 min, during which they
received 12 10 s presentations of two conditioned stimuli (CS; houselight or
tone) paired with one of two outcomes (pellets or sucrose) on a random time
5 s schedule throughout the CS. CS presentations were pseudorandom with
a variable ITI that averaged to 1min. CS-outcome contingencies were counter-
balanced. Magazine entries throughout the session were recorded and sepa-
rated into a CS period and an interval before CS presentations of equal length
(PreCS: 10 s).
Instrumental Training
Rats were trained to lever press on a RR-2 schedule of reinforcement. Each
session lasted for 12.5 min and consisted of two 5 min sessions on each lever
separated by a 2.5 min time-out period in which the levers were retracted. The
order of presentation of each lever was pseudorandom. For half of the animals
in each group, the left lever earned a 2 s houselight presentation and the right
lever earned a 2 s tone presentation. The remaining animals were trained on
the opposite action-stimulus contingencies. No food outcomeswere delivered
during the instrumental training sessions.
Stage 2: Excitatory Response-Stimulus-Outcome Associations
Instrumental Training
Rats were trained to lever press on RR schedules of reinforcement. Each ses-
sion lasted for 22.5 min and consisted of two 10 min sessions on each lever
separated by a 2.5 min time-out period in which the levers were retracted.
The order of presentation of each lever was pseudorandom. Excitatory asso-
ciations were trained in a manner that directly opposed prior inhibitory associ-
ations (see Supplemental Information for details). Each CS presentation was
2 s, and CSs and food outcomes were presented concurrently for that 2 s..
For the first day, lever pressing was continuously reinforced. Rats were shifted
to a RR-5 schedule for the next 2 days (i.e., each action delivered an outcome
with a probability of 0.2), then to an RR-10 schedule (or a probability of 0.1) for
the final 4 days.
Stage 3: Test
Rats were tested over the 2 days following the final day of excitatory instru-
mental training. Each test session began with a 15 min period of extinction
to lower the rats’ rate of responding on both levers. After 15 min, lever presses
on both levers started earning one of the two stimuli (houselight or tone, coun-
terbalanced) for 5 min. The response-stimulus (R-S) associations were there-
fore congruent with training for one of the lever press-stimuli combinations and
incongruent for the other. During this test, no outcomes were delivered, but
lever presses were recorded. The next day, a second test was administered
with the opposite stimulus. That is, if both levers had previously earned house-
light presentations, they now earned tone, and if both levers previously earned
the tone, they now earned houselight presentations.
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